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Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to understand the texture and emotional tenor of the relations that 
bereaved people can have with a range of objects, including those that seem mundane or 
simply part of the flotsam and jetsam of everyday life. Taking Joan Didion’s best-selling 
book, The Year of Magical Thinking, as its focus, the paper examines the varied and 
significant roles that certain objects played as she negotiated the vagaries of her first year 
as a widow. While previous literature has mined the memorialising function of goods for 
survivors, our analysis suggests that goods and consumption experiences can also play a 
powerful role as tools to think with for those struggling to create a meaningful narrative 
of death and loss. It concludes by considering the contribution of the analysis to the 
understanding of goods as 'active life presences' (Turkle, 2007), the relationship between 
consumption and bereavement, and 'the sadness of lives and the comfort of things' 
(Miller, 2008).  
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The sadness of lives and the comfort of things: goods as evocative 
objects in bereavement 
 
"We find it familiar to consider objects as useful or aesthetic, as necessities or 
vain indulgences. We are on less familiar ground when we consider objects as 
companions to our emotional lives or as provocations to thought" (Turkle 2007, 
p. 5). 
 
Turkle's observation comes from the field of social studies. At one level, many consumer 
researchers may take issue with her claim that the relationship between goods and 
thinking or feeling marks 'less familiar ground'. After all, much scholarship in our field 
has been inspired by Levy's (1959) seminal paper on the symbolic nature of consumption 
and Douglas and Isherwood's (1980, p. 62) observation that 'commodities are good for 
thinking…a nonverbal medium for the human creative faculty'. Numerous consumer 
researchers, and scholars from other disciplines, have underscored the symbiotic 
relationships between thinking, feeling and the world of material objects (Arnould and 
Thompson, 2005; Borgerson, 2005; Csikszentmihàlyi and Rochberg-Halton, 1981; 
Grayson and Shulman, 2000; McCracken, 1986; Miller, 2008, 2010; Zwick and 
Dholakia, 2006). 
  
At another level, however, Turkle's argument may give pause for further thought. Her 
reflections on how 'material culture contains emotions and ideas of startling intensity' (p. 
6) are a timely reminder to consumer researchers of the depth and passion that is possible 
in person-object relationships, and of the inseparability of our thinking and emotions 
towards material goods.  Some significant contributions have already been made to this 
research agenda (Belk, 1988; Belk, Wallendorf, and Sherry, 1989; Curasi, Price, and 
Arnould, 2004; Epp and Price, 2010; Grafton-Small, 1983; Pavia, 1993; Price, Arnould, 
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and Curasi, 2000), but Turkle, and the scholars contributing to her collection, encourage 
us to consider further just how much things can matter.  
 
So, if things matter, and some things matter a lot, they are likely to do so at particular 
times in a consumer's life. Bereavement suggests itself as one such time. Things loom 
large in the lives of survivors and the loss they feel, and the things that matter go beyond 
houses and heirlooms. Some things are personal, others were shared. Some carry a past, 
others point to a painful present or a future that is now no more. The clothes from the 
hospital are in a suitcase on the floor. Mail for the dead still comes through the letterbox.  
Their book lies open on the bedside locker. The yoghurt nobody else likes sits in the 
fridge. Their new shoes for the wedding they will never attend are still in the box. The 
two-seater sofa has only one occupant. Individually and collectively, these become 
'evocative objects', 'companions to our emotional lives' and 'provocations to thought' 
(Turkle, 2007, p. 5), and do so with a passion and intensity they never had before, 
precisely because somebody has died. 
 
This paper seeks to understand the texture and emotional tenor of the relations bereaved 
people can have with objects. We begin by reviewing current literature on death, grieving 
and consumption, together with changing perspectives on the nature of bereavement. 
Then, focusing on one case study, Joan Didion's account of losing her husband of almost 
forty years, we explore the varied and significant roles that objects played as she 
negotiated the vagaries of her first year as a widow. We conclude by considering the 
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contribution of our analysis to the understanding of goods as 'active life presences' 
(Turkle, 2007, p. 9) and to the relationship between consumption and bereavement.  
 
Dying, bereavement and consumption 
A modest if growing number of researchers have begun to examine how death, dying and 
bereavement intersect with the world of consumption. Their foci of interest parallel the 
trajectory of death itself. For example, one group has examined the role of impending 
death on consumers with particular emphasis on deliberate dispossession and the 
distillation of personal inventory as role decrements increase and life runs out (Kates, 
2001; Pavia, 1993; Price et al., 2000; Young and Wallendorf, 1989). A second group has 
begun to explore the consumer behaviour of friends, family, and spouses as death 
approaches and their loved one departs (Bonsu and Belk, 2003; Canning and Szmigin, 
2010; Gabel, Mansfield, and Westbrook, 1996; Gentry, Kennedy, Paul, and Hill, 1995). 
Much of this work highlights how decision-making powers are problematized at this time 
of cataclysmic personal upheaval, and how comporting oneself as a consumer 
customarily does may raise eyebrows or lead to condemnation by others. As Bonsu and 
Belk (2003) demonstrate, a great deal can be at stake for families undertaking funerary 
rituals. Moving beyond the Western perspective which has characterised most consumer 
research in this area, their study highlighted how Asante death rituals and related 
consumption practices had significant implications for the social identity of the deceased.   
 
A third group of consumer researchers has looked at how those left behind comport 
themselves once the immediate postmortem period has passed. At this point consumers 
 6 
are typically attempting to chart a course through the vagaries and desolation of the 
grieving process, and, while no longer needing the services of providers such as funeral 
directors and lawyers, marketplace concerns can play a significant role in how this 
process is negotiated. A limited number of authors have taken this medium-term 
perspective and their work falls into two identifiable research streams. First are those who 
focus on the role of goods in preserving the memory of the departed loved one (Gentry et 
al., 1995; Gentry and Goodwin, 1995; Grafton-Small, 1993; Stevenson and Kates, 1999). 
Second are authors who focus less on memorializing than on how goods can be active 
partners with bereaved people as they embark on a sense-making and identity-
maintenance enterprise (Bonsu 2007; O'Donohoe and Turley, 2005). An anthropological 
perspective on such practices is provided in Layne's (2000) searing account of how baby 
clothes, toys and other baby-related goods are used by bereaved parents following 
stillbirth or neonatal death to tell themselves and others that they are mourning ‘a real 
baby with real baby things’.  This suggests that goods contribute actively to retaining and 
reformulating the identities of the dead and survivors’ relationships with them. The 
current study situates itself within this ‘present tense’ perspective. 
 
It is worth noting that while consumer behavior scholars have begun to study 
bereavement, bereavement scholars have been studying consumption for quite some time. 
This is hardly surprising, since anthropology and material culture feature prominently in 
the literature on death and dying (Francis, Kellaher, and Neophytou, 2005; Hallam and 
Hockey, 2001; Hockey, Kellaher, and Prendergast, 2007; Walter, 1999). This work has 
given valuable insight into how artefacts are incorporated into funerary behaviour, 
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interment traditions, and memorialising practices, and how they serve not only to 
remember the dead but also to foster social identities and relationships between the living 
and the dead (Hallam and Hockey, 2001).  Gibson (2004) notes how objects used in 
grieving may be transformed over time into "melancholy objects" which encapsulate 
memories of grieving. Based on interviews with Australian survivors, she discusses the 
moral decisions surrounding the dispersal and disposal of objects belonging to the dead 
for example, how selling household effects was considered acceptable but selling clothes 
was not, and how selling inherited jewellery was easier when the deceased was 
emotionally, geographically, or generationally distant (Gibson, 2008). The cemetery itself 
can be ‘a site for ongoing practices of commemoration, a place of individual, family and 
collective memory and future cultural heritage…[and] a substantial and visible agreement 
among individuals that they will not let each other die’ (Francis et al., 2007, p. 214). 
Thus, plants, flowers, photographs and other artefacts were placed on graves in various 
London cemeteries ‘to keep the deceased's identity alive and to regenerate their 
relationships even after death’ (p. 4). Other scholars exploring material culture have also 
provided deeply moving accounts of the meaning of particular things associated with the 
dead (Dasté, 2007; Miller, 2008; Pollak, 2007), but have not focused on broader 
questions concerning person-object relations in bereavement. 
 
Changing perspectives on bereavement 
A virtual sea-change in the study of bereavement and grieving has led the traditional 
Freudian paradigm of grief to be problematised and increasingly discarded.  Freud’s 
(1917) view of grief as articulated in ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ looms colossus-like 
 8 
over 20th century thinking on the purpose and process of mourning. As the theoretical 
progenitor of detachment theory, his views have attracted many adherents (Bowlby, 
1999; Lindemann, 1944; Parkes, 1996) and have served as an intellectual wellspring for 
both clinical and academic understandings of mourning (Seale, 1998; Silverman and 
Klass, 1996).  Freud depicted mourning as:  
‘a normal, even universal, intrapsychic process the main function of which is the 
incremental divestment of libido (decathexis) from memories of the lost object.  It 
is by means of this painful process that psychological equilibrium is restored and 
motivation to love is renewed. With the successful completion of the work of 
mourning all ties to the lost object are relinquished and premorbid functioning 
restored’ (Hagman, 2001, p. 15).  
 
Whatever his original intention, Freud's description mutated into a prescriptive linear 
phasic model of emotional detachment, the eventual aim being to move on and live 
without the deceased. It was both universalist and normative and succeeded in focusing 
attention away from the mourned in the direction of the mourner and in transmuting the 
recently departed loved one into a memory, a protagonist in the past-tense as opposed to a 
participant in the present. In this sense, it resonated with a 20th century secular and 
individualistic zeitgeist and represented a welcome counterpoint to excessive Victorian 
emotionality and the cult of the dead. It also medicalised grief, viewing it as a disease 
from which bereaved people would recover (Walter, 1999). The success of grief 
intervention according to this model was gauged by the speed and efficiency with which 
those left behind could separate and detach themselves from the dead. The corollary of 
this injunction was that those who failed to let go, who chose to live with the dead, 
should be categorized as pathological and treated accordingly (Hagman, 2001). 
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As the last century drew to a close, bereavement scholars grew increasingly dissatisfied 
with this model, viewing it primarily as an artefact of Western modernity.   
‘Over our history as a species, humans’ continued interaction with people after 
they have died is a far more common pattern than is severing the bonds with the 
dead, as Westerners have been advised to do through most of the twentieth 
century’ (Klass and Walter, 2001, p. 431). 
 
Klass and Walter's conclusion underscores how academic orthodoxy can sometimes 
prove so blinkered and so patently at odds with what bereaved people actually do. It also 
serves to acknowledge the dominance of the Freudian paradigm which marks the 
departure point for their own contrasting view of what bereavement is about. Widely 
termed the Continuing Bonds approach, this alternative model sees communication and 
ongoing inner relationships with the departed as common, functional and healthy 
(Gilbert, 2006). Attachment should be privileged over detachment; grieving is about 
living with the dead, not without them (Walter, 1999). Social interaction is not terminated 
just because the deceased person is absent; relationships with them can continue and 
develop. In fact people regularly talk to those who are living but absent. Objects appear 
to have a role to play in continuing bonds; indeed, use of possessions of the deceased is 
being used as a measure of continuing bonds in experimental thanatology (Boelen, 
Stroebe, Schut, and Zijerveld, 2006; Field, Nichols, Holen, and Horowitz, 1999). 
 
Proponents of Continuing Bonds would not wish to downplay the devastating emotional 
and psychological chaos that follow on the death of a loved one, their search to find what 
cannot be found, and their desperate attempt to make sense of a world that seems 
meaningless and irrelevant. ‘Death radically puts in question the taken-for-granted, 
“business-as-usual” attitude in which one exists in everyday life…everything in that 
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world becomes dubious’ (Berger, 1967, p. 43). The shared understanding of how things 
are - the ‘assumptive world’ that has been jointly fashioned in conversation with 
significant others over many years - is sundered (Parkes, 1996). In this sense, grieving is 
a meaning-making exercise where we have to relearn the world, ‘to reweave the fabric of 
our lives…without those we love by our side’ (Attig, 2001, p. 41).  So, the array of tried 
and trusted meanings, understandings and feelings bound up in the relationship that was, 
have now to be transformed so that the survivor can go on without the physical other 
while continuing to experience a refashioned bond with them (Hagman, 2001). 
Continuing bonds are predicated precisely on this willingness to engage with this 
daunting meaning-making enterprise, an enterprise that comprises two principal strands. 
First, ‘[d]eath asks us for identity’ (Fulton, 1965, p. 3); the loss of a loved one can 
engender a profound shift in our understanding of who we are. The shared past can no 
longer be shared. The part of us invested in a valued role is surplus to requirements, so 
that survivors resemble relational amputees. Second, making sense of the personal 
vacuum in our lives requires that we ask ‘who was this person who has died?’ As far as 
identities are concerned, continuing bonds means that it can never be ‘business as usual’ 
after the death of a loved one. Identities of both survivor and deceased have to be 
refashioned. 
 
Recreating the identity of a departed significant other has been likened to creating an 
inner representation of them with which we can interact (Howarth, 2007). Bereaved 
people do not typically abandon a biography featuring the deceased in the interests of 
creating another from which they are absent, they do not create a new biography ab 
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initio. As Walter (1997) puts it, they are more likely to create a 'durable biography' of the 
dead person, one that 'need not be true or agreed. All it needs is to be good enough for 
practical purposes' (p. 263). Such durable biographies may be formulated jointly with 
acquaintances of the deceased, but they may also be accomplished by speaking (or 
writing) to a generalised other (Stroebe, 1997).  
 
Although continuing bonds and meaning-making perspectives highlight the centrality of 
thinking as well as feeling for experiences of bereavement, such thinking is not 
necessarily rational. For Lunghi (2006), the transition from existence to non-existence is 
such a powerful ontological dilemma that bereaved people often resort to magical 
thinking about the continuity of existence and identity of the dead. Many well-educated 
Western people retain a range of magical, paranormal and superstitious beliefs, based on 
ontological confusion concerning 'core attributes of mental, physical, and biological 
entities and processes' (Lindeman and Aarnio, 2007, p. 732). By shattering the 
assumptive world, bereavement creates the conditions for these beliefs to infiltrate sense-
making processes. 
 
Lindeman and Aarnio draw on Frazer's (1922/1963) laws of sympathetic magic in their 
analysis of this mode of thought. According to the law of contagion, for example, things 
that were previously in contact with each other continue to act upon each other, and the 
law of similarity holds that resemblance indicates or even creates deeper similarity. 
Zusne and Jones (1989, p. 13) describe magical thinking in terms of beliefs: 
 ‘…that (a) transfer of energy or information between physical systems may take 
place solely because of their similarity or contiguity in time and space or (b) that 
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one’s thoughts, words or actions can achieve specific physical effects in a manner 
not governed by the principles of ordinary transmission of energy or information’.  
 
Similarly, Broad (1953) refers to anomalistic thinking as violating four basic limiting 
principles: causation, the dependence of mind on brain, the power of mind over matter, 
and ways of acquiring knowledge. Although such thinking is associated primarily with 
children, dual process theories hold that magical beliefs persist among adults alongside 
more rational, analytical modes of thought (Lindeman and Aarnio, 2007).  
 
Overall, this paper situates itself in the broad field of literature looking at person-object 
relations. More specifically, it looks at the multiple roles of goods and possessions in the 
lives of bereaved people, consumers who have been left behind, as they cope with loss of 
meaning and loss of those they continue to love. In so doing it draws upon what the 
Continuing Bonds perspective has to say about the life of survivors and their 
relationships with those they mourn. According to this perspective objects should 
perform a variety of roles in support of these post-mortem relationships, roles that extend 
beyond simply memorialising those who are no longer with us. 
 
Methodology 
This paper seeks to explore the significance of goods in bereaved people's lives, and to do 
so through the prism of 'pathography', a particular form of popular culture. The value of 
popular literature as a source of insight into consumption has been recognised for some 
time (Belk 1986, 1987; Friedman, 1985; Holbrook, 1991, 1995). Such works:  
‘provide new paths to thick description. They refresh the parts that other research 
procedures cannot reach … and provide experiential knowledge – knowledge of 
the agonies and ecstasies rather than the propositional knowledge that comes 
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from the empirical experimental endeavours of most marketing and consumer 
researchers’ (Brown, 2005, p. 232).  
 
The advantage of drawing on works of popular literature for consumer behaviour 
purposes lies precisely in the fact that consumer products function symbolically in 
literature as they do in everyday life, as part of a wider complex network of symbolic 
meanings (Holbrook, Bell, and Grayson, 1989). Hirschman (1990) identified 
autobiographies in particular as valuable repositories of insight into the values and 
ideologies that underpin patterns of consumption, but the potential of such accounts to 
shed light on the behaviour of bereaved consumers has yet to be fully realised.  
 
The particular autobiographical form of interest in this paper is the pathography, a 
personal and often poignant account of illness, dying or bereavement (Hawkins, 1999; 
Wiltshire, 2000). Pathographies have become a staple of contemporary best-seller lists 
(Goldberg, 2006, Lawson, 2010) and several have successfully made the transition to 
celluloid. These books comprise ‘coruscating self-scrutiny and an intimate examination 
of their lives as they bid goodbye’ (Gerrard, 1997, p. 5). Although many authors express 
the desire to help others cope with illness or challenge traditional forms of treatment, 
Hawkins (1999, p. 129) suggests that all are engaged in 'a kind of psychic rebuilding that 
involves finding patterns, imposing order, and, for many, discovering meaning'.   
 
A variant or sub-genre of pathographies are 'grief accounts' (Dennis, 2008), works of 
literature that furnish an account of life following bereavement. Telling the dead person’s 
story tells the storymaker who the deceased was, and by extension who the storymaker is 
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(Walter, 1999), and it is this fused biographical/autobiographical imperative that 
underpins much of what occupies the time and thinking of bereaved people. C. S. Lewis’ 
A Grief Observed (1961) is arguably the literary progenitor of this sub-genre and has 
been hailed as ‘one of the most revealing personal accounts of loss and grieving in the 
English language’ (Attig, 2001, p. 35). The book is an intimate and unflinching account 
of his coming to grips with the emotional paralysis following the death of his wife Joy 
Gresham and was the inspiration for the successful film Shadowlands in 1993.  
 
Almost half a century later, the renowned American author Joan Didion published her 
account of personal loss and grief following the sudden death of her husband, John 
Dunne, entitled The Year of Magical Thinking (Didion, 2006).  This award-winning and 
best-selling grief account, lauded as 'the one indispensable handbook to bereavement' 
(Luckhurst, 2009), serves as case study for this paper. As well as affording us an indelible 
and searing account of the months following John’s death (Kakutani, 2005; Pinsky, 2005; 
Wood, 2006), it is also replete with  illuminating instances of goods as 'active presences' 
as she struggled to make sense of her loss. Didion was supremely positioned to write 
about the experience of bereavement. She was already a celebrated novelist and an 
exponent of 'new journalism', a literary form of reportage that emphasises the writer's 
subjectivity and perspective (Wolfe, 1975). Indeed, as she notes, ‘The way I write is who 
I am, or who I have become’ (Didion, 2006, p. 7).   
 
Dunne was also an established journalist, literary critic and novelist, and had co-authored 
a number of screenplays with Didion during their thirty-nine year marriage. Beginning 
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with his cardiac arrest in their New York apartment, the book offers a forensic 
introspection and dissection of her emotional and cognitive journey through the first year 
of bereavement (Kakutani, 2005).  The narrative structure of the book alternates between 
revisiting the events surrounding his death, her current travails in making sense of what 
had happened, her belief that John would come back, and her fears for their daughter 
Quintana who had lain unconscious in hospital the night he died and remained seriously 
ill throughout her first year of widowhood. In the course of Didion’s account, it becomes 
apparent that possessions play a powerful role throughout the grieving process.  
 
The life she shared with John and their daughter was that of a professional, urbane, 
cosmopolitan, and independent, nuclear family. As a result, the account she pens of her 
first year without him can come across as self-contained, rarefied, and solitary, far 
removed from the life world of others facing loss.  However, as Lawson (2010) reminds 
us, bereavement is always an individual, idiosyncratic, and singular experience while 
retaining elements that are common to all.  In Didion's case her revered literary prowess 
enabled her to craft a taut, precise, and meticulously detailed account of grief (Pinsky, 
2005) and its relationship to consumer goods. 
 
However much detail and insight Didion's memoir affords, such written accounts are 
inevitably restricted to the material presented by the author; researchers cannot seek 
elaboration or reflection on particular aspects of an experience, but must rely on analysis 
of the text. Although literary critics or narrative analysts may focus on different 
dimensions, we approached the book as interpretive consumer researchers and undertook 
 16 
a three-tier mode of analysis. First, we conducted a ‘close reading’ (Hirschman, 1990; 
Levy, 1981) and thematic analysis (Dennis, 2008) of The Year of Magical Thinking on an 
individual basis. At this point the analysis was directed at identifying and interpreting any 
incidents, expressions, or reminiscences relating to consumption. Second, all these 
consumption-related excerpts were pooled and jointly interpreted with a view to 
identifying roles that featured objects played during Didion's mourning. Third, we sought 
to organise and integrate these roles into higher order modalities. Throughout this 
analytical process, we revisited parts of the book, and reread it in its entirety, to ensure 
that any emergent understandings could be sustained in the context of Didion's overall 
grief account.  
 
 
Findings 
The findings are presented in terms of a number of modalities or functions that goods and 
possessions played as Didion negotiated the loss of her husband. These modalities can 
usefully be classified under three broad headings: possessions as tools for magical 
thinking, possessions as props for continuing bonds, and possessions as pitfalls.  
 
Tools for magical thinking 
In Didion's own words, magical thinking involves thinking as if ‘thoughts or wishes had 
the power to reverse the narrative, change the outcome’ (p. 35). Indeed, throughout her 
book, '[r]epetitive syntactical structures convey both a sense of magical incantation to 
keep him alive, but also a kind of post-traumatic automatism' (Luckhurst, 2009, p. 93).  
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These child-like modes of logic, language and learning may be seen as an understandable 
response to a major loss, a loss that requires ‘relearning the world’ (Attig, 2001) when it 
disintegrates with the death of someone we love. This was a particularly strong 
imperative for Didion, given the intensity of her relationship with Dunne - forty years of 
close proximity during the working day as well as the rest of the week - and the 
importance of each other as conversational partners, professionally and personally. 
 
As Luckhurst (2009, p. 94) notes, Didion's grief account is suffused with 'the 
everydayness of her small acts of magical thinking, their fleetingness and interstitiality, 
the way they can co-exist with perfectly rational and ordered social behaviours'. Our 
analysis suggests that for Didion, goods became tools or props for such everyday acts of 
magical thinking. The magic in Didion’s magical thinking admittedly comports many of 
the features of magic in general such as the suspension and/or inversion of spatio-
temporal logic and causation. However, unlike readers who voluntarily immerse 
themselves in the make-believe world of a Harry Potter novel, there is little sense in 
Didion’s account of elective escapism, of turning deliberately to this child-like mode of 
thinking in search of therapeutic solace. Rather, the shattering of her assumptive world 
(Parkes, 1996) causes her reasoning to be infiltrated by less rational beliefs.  
 
The first ‘magical’ function identified in this analysis is that of products as auguries. For 
Parkes (1996) searching, together with pining, its emotional concomitant, are 
distinguishing features of the early stages of grief. The urge to search is not mitigated by 
the realisation of its inherent futility. In the post-mortem period survivors typically seek 
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out places and possessions associated with the deceased, but they can also look 
backwards in search of auguries or intimations given by the dead that their departure was 
imminent. The fact that these intimations were typically oblique and disguised does not 
diminish the guilt survivors feel at their failure to recognise them for what they were. She 
repeatedly berates herself for failing in this regard, using the refrain: ‘I had not 
sufficiently appreciated it’. What was intimated is only recognised in hindsight. However, 
this retrospective searching can help sustain the ‘bliss of the conditional, the hypothetical 
cosmos’ (Gilbert, 2006). Despite the guilt and regret it may entail, the conditional is a 
more comforting tense than the present after a death, carrying as it does connotations of 
reversibility. Didion’s account is replete with such retrospective ‘what ifs’, and they are 
usually mediated through material possessions. 
 
Two incidents illustrate this role of products as auguries to good effect. In the first she 
recalls being out to dinner with John shortly before his death. He had forgotten to bring 
the cards he customarily used to record random thoughts for inclusion in whatever he was 
writing, so he asked Joan to jot something down in her notebook on his behalf. When she 
gave him the notebook next day he dismissively told her ‘You can use it if you want to’. 
She muses: ‘Was something telling him that night that the time for being able to write 
was running out?’  The second incident, a night or two before he died, involved John 
asking Joan if she knew how many characters died in a novel of his that had just been 
dispatched to the printers. In front of him was a list of the names he could remember on a 
notepad. A few months after his death, Joan happens upon the notebook and notices how 
John had written the names using a very faint pencil. Yet again, she ponders: ‘Why 
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would he use a pencil that barely left a mark. When did he begin seeing himself as dead?’ 
Central to these and similar cases of possessions being interpreted as auguries is the 
ascription of foreknowledge of the impending demise to the departed loved one. In both 
instances it is important to note that the primary agency ascribed to the objects in 
question, notebook and pencil, is not related to memorialising. Neither object simply 
‘reminds’ her of John; indeed the notebook was hers to begin with. Looking back, Didion 
is convinced that John had some awareness of his imminent death and that this awareness 
was communicated to her through the agency of these material artefacts. 
 
Bauman (1998, p. 28) notes that: ‘goods have memento mori written all over them, even 
if with an invisible ink’. For Didion, some goods served as portents or harbingers of 
death – John's death, rather than her own.  Unlike the role of augury above, there is no 
human agency or instrumentality involved here. It is as though nature and the world of 
objects, of their own accord, were trying to serve as omens or prescient agents of what 
was about to happen. Didion notes how: 
 ‘Survivors look back and see omens, messages they missed. They remember the 
tree that died, the gull that splattered onto the hood of the car. They live by 
symbols. They read meaning into the barrage of spam on the unused computer, 
the delete key that stops working, the imagined abandonment in the decision to 
replace it’ (p.152). 
 
It is as though the world of objects, either through malfunction or malevolence, had 
sought in vain to forewarn survivors of what lay in store for them. Products can perform 
the role of portent in a retrospective fashion also: 
‘There are Christmas lights on the quince branches in the living room. There 
were also colored Christmas lights on quince branches in the living room a year 
ago, on the night it happened, but in the spring…those strings burned out, went 
dead. This served as a symbol’ (p. 212). 
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In sum, whether material goods are marshalled as auguries by the still-living loved one or 
whether they act of their own accord as independent portents of impending death, the 
likelihood is that survivors will have failed to pick up on what was intimated and will 
subsequently berate themselves for this lack of perspicacity and retrospective oversight. 
None of the objects featuring in this magical thinking are subsequently cherished as 
mementos of John. Their performative function and prominence lie primarily in the way 
they presaged the future as opposed to memorialising any past.  
 
The next ‘magical’ function might best be described as ‘products as pathways to return’. 
This dimension was particularly evident in the earlier post-mortem period. Two months 
after the death, Didion set about disposing of her husband’s clothes. Although Gibson 
(2004) notes how the clothes of the dead, imprinted with their shape, size and odour, have 
great power in their immediacy, Didion saw this act of disposal as a standard 
unproblematic element of post-funeral ritual; it was ‘part of what people did’. She began 
carrying out this task for John’s belongings in a business-like fashion, placing the 
contents of his wardrobe in bags to be donated to a local church. Thinking that disposing 
of his suits might prove emotionally demanding, she opted instead to bag his shoes. 
However this was something she found herself simply unable to do, for a reason that was 
immediately apparent to her: ‘he would need shoes if he was to return’ (p. 37).  This is 
quite distinct from instances of mummification (Francis et al., 2005; Gentry et al., 1995) 
where survivors keep the dead person’s personal inventory or bedroom ‘exactly as they 
left it’ as an untouched memorial. Here, Didion was in the full throes of disposing of 
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John’s wardrobe and was pulled up unexpectedly by a perceived necessity to keep his 
shoes. 
 
She also realises that the same reasoning lay behind her refusal to accede to a request to 
donate John’s organs following the autopsy: ‘How could he come back if they took his 
organs?’ These incidents highlight not only how magical thinking is performed through 
objects but also how powerful and persistent an impulse it is, even when we are aware of 
it. As Didion herself reflects:   
‘”Bringing him back" had been through these months my hidden focus, a magic 
trick. By late summer I was beginning to see this clearly. "Seeing it clearly" did 
not yet allow me to give away the clothes he would need’ (p. 44). 
 
Disposing of the possessions of a departed loved one has begun to attract the attention of 
researchers (Kates, 2001; Miller and Parrott, 2009; Young and Wallendorf, 1989). 
Didion’s account suggests that survivors’ reluctance to part with what was close to the 
departed may be more textured than previously thought.  The received wisdom that 
possessions are retained primarily to serve as mementos of the dead may serve to obscure 
other more immediate concerns, particularly for those recently bereaved.  
 
It is worth stressing here that the ‘return’ in question is a physical, corporeal one. As 
Gibson (2004, p. 291) notes, ‘… the ongoing absence of the deceased in their bodily 
being is one of the profound existential shocks of bereavement and the desire for their 
bodily return is a powerful fantasy in the early months of a death’. Indeed, Parkes (1996) 
has shown convincingly that the constant searching characteristic of many recently 
bereaved people betokens belief in such a return. They search precisely because they 
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believe their loved one can be found. Thus, Didion’s resolve to retain John’s shoes and 
his organs is not based on a desire to remember him by them but by a more pressing and 
proximate concern that he should have what he needs when he is found. As the title of her 
book states, Didion’s account is that of a woman recently bereaved. The possibility of 
forgetting him was, at that stage, unthinkable, the need to preserve personal effects to 
remember him by almost non-existent. 
 
The magical thinking of the book’s title is thinking that both countenances and conjures 
up narrative reversibility. Thinking that John would return was the exemplar, but many 
other cases of confounding causal and spatio-temporal conventions populate her account. 
They often feature objects that function as talismanic agents of time-reversal. By virtue of 
the fact that they fulfilled a role prior to John’s death, they now possess the power to 
conjure up and reinstate that past as present. This suspension of chronological linear time 
is also echoed in the common observation by bereaved people that ‘time stands still’ 
(Francis et al., 2005). Didion and her husband had lived and worked for 24 years in Los 
Angeles. After moving to New York, they still made a point of coming back regularly to 
LA and, when they did, it was usually to stay at the Beverly Wiltshire Hotel. While many 
locations in LA were associated with John and thus had the power to ‘trigger the vortex’ 
effect, 
‘the Beverly Wiltshire seemed … the only safe place for me to be, the place where 
everything would be the same, the place where no one would know about or refer 
to the events of my recent life; the place where I would still be the person I had 
been before any of this happened’ (p.114). 
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 In this case it was a hotel room whose housekeepers, doormen, safety-deposit box, 
shower heads were so utterly familiar, so much a part of her former life, that they could 
magically transport her back to a time when she was Joan, still married to John.   
If goods can act as pathways to return they also do exactly the opposite; they can just as 
magically act as prohibitors of return. In an intriguing passage that typifies the magical 
thinking that John will return, Didion expresses the wish that public awareness of his 
death could be contained. The items militating against or prohibiting his return in this 
case are obituaries. One might have thought that a surviving spouse would welcome 
public acknowledgement and appreciation for a deceased spouse in newspaper obituaries 
however, she:  
‘could not read them. This continued from when the first obituaries appeared, 
until the night of the 2004 Academy Awards, when I saw a photograph of John in 
the Academy’s ‘In Memoriam’ montage. When I saw the photograph I realized for 
the first time why the obituaries had so disturbed me. I had allowed other people 
to think he was dead. I had allowed him to be buried alive’ (35). 
 
Publicising the death constitutes complicity in his burial, limiting the numbers who know 
can affect and effect the likelihood and ease with which he can physically resume his 
rightful place in the body social. Ironically, these same obituaries may well serve to 
perpetuate the deceased’s place in social memory, not least when transformed into 
newspaper In Memoriams on subsequent anniversaries (Adams, 1997; Bonsu, 2007). 
 
Props for continuing bonds 
The emergence of the Continuing Bonds perspective was outlined earlier. While Didion’s 
autodidactic reading on bereavement and scouring of the internet centre exclusively on 
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traditional Freudian approaches to grieving1, the novel itself is replete with examples of 
her own continuing, albeit transformed, bond with John. Possessions act as facilitators of 
this bond, the second person-object modality, and do so in a variety of ways. Arguably 
the most memorable instance was on the night of the death when she returns alone to the 
apartment from the hospital carrying his belongings in a plastic bag. She writes: ‘I 
remember combining the cash that had been in his pocket with the cash in my own bag, 
smoothing the bills, taking special care to interleaf twenties with twenties, tens with tens, 
fives and ones with fives and ones’ (p.18). There is an overpowering sense here of the 
conjoined dollar bills serving as both metaphor and marker of her need to stay close to 
him. It is as though the physical fusing of their respective finances can help secure the 
continuation of a bond forged over four decades.  
 
Some goods seem to harbour material traces of those who have died. This function of 
possessions is vividly captured when Didion describes how:  
‘The voice on my answering machine is still John’s. The fact that it was his in the 
first place was arbitrary, having to do with who was around on the day the 
answering machine last needed programming, but if I need to retape it now I 
would do so with a sense of betrayal. One day when I was talking on the 
telephone in his office I mindlessly turned the pages of the dictionary that he had 
always left open on the table by the desk. When I realized what I had done I was 
stricken: what word had he last looked up, what had he been thinking? By turning 
the pages had I lost the message?’ (p.152). 
 
This passage captures how mundane functional goods that were not necessarily singular 
or cherished can serve as potent material footprints of the departed and how easily they 
can be unwittingly expunged by those left behind. In this sense, possessions become 
'evocative objects' (Turkle, 2007) anchoring the departed in the land of the living and 
                                                 
1
 we thank Tony Walter for this observation 
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thereby sustaining continuing bonds. At another level it also underscores how, by 
enabling the dead to linger a little longer, material goods can serve to undermine the 
radical disjuncture between life and death, between the living and the dead (Baudrillard, 
1993). Challenging simplistic notions of goods as merely associated with the dead, and of 
the dead as detached from the materiality of existence, Gibson (2004, p. 293)  insists that 
‘[w]hile material things are associated with the deceased they are also part of the 
substance of their very being’.  
 
Field (1996) has noted how death can often lead to role decrements, and Commuri and 
Gentry (2000) have emphasised how transitional interstices between roles can furnish 
valuable insights into how we consume.  After a death, survivors can lose the role of 
spouse, partner, daughter, or friend. Conversely, they can acquire new ones, usually 
unwanted, such as widow or orphan. Joan Didion is no exception in this regard and is 
startled when she first hears the term ‘widow’ applied to her. ‘I have trouble thinking of 
myself as a widow. I remember hesitating the first time I had to check that box on the 
‘marital status’ part of a form’ (p. 208). However, one role transition attendant on the 
death of a spouse or partner that is typically ignored is that from joint to sole ownership. 
One of the most difficult lessons for Didion in relearning the world after losing John is 
finding the emotional wherewithal to substitute ‘my’ for ‘our’. Three months after the 
death she continues to refer to ‘John’s and my apartment’ (p. 86). Didion’s behaviour 
here encapsulates an intriguing intersection between the continuing bonds perspective 
and the notions of co-ownership and co-consumption in consumer behaviour. Co-
ownership, whether incarnated in deeds, documents, titles, or simple possession can 
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function as a material concomitant and confirmation of a bond between two people that 
can continue beyond the grave. Ownership is agency, albeit disembodied agency, and as 
long as they own something the dead make a difference.  
 
A final way in which material goods facilitate continuing bonds for Didion is where items 
that were tangentially or coincidentally connected with the deceased become privileged 
over time during the post-mortem period. This appears to be distinct from cases where 
intimate and close possessions of the deceased, elements of their extended selves (Belk, 
1988), are understandably treasured and retained as inalienable objects by those left 
behind (Curasi et al., 2004). Indeed, in Didion’s case the objects in question seem to have 
emerged somewhat serendipitously. One night, eight months after the death, she found 
herself using a ‘crackled and worn Spode plate’ when preparing dinner alone in the 
apartment.  A set of these plates had been given to John in his single days, but they had 
been scarcely used during their marriage and many had been broken. From this night on 
however, Didion deliberately ran her dishwasher quarter full so that at least one of the set 
would always be ready for use. Other examples of this posthumous privileging of 
unremarkable possessions included her retaining a modest wafer-thin alarm clock that 
had stopped working even before he died together with some ballpoint pens that had long 
gone dry. Didion’s privileging of certain goods echoes other accounts of how certain 
objects can move from mundane commodity to valued memento via singularisation and 
decommodification (Epp and Price, 2010; Kopytoff, 1986).  Together with other 
significant life transitions and disruptions, the loss of a loved one can occasion major 
turning points in the biographies of material goods associated with them.  
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In summary, it should be noted that the collective role of material goods in sustaining 
continuing bonds is both conceptually and operationally distinct from the role of goods as 
memorial objects. The combined dollar bills, the voice on the answering machine, the 
open dictionary page, the joint ownership and the Spode plates serve in concert to support 
and sustain a continuing bond, not to remember or memorialise a bond that has been 
irreparably severed. 
 
Possessions as pitfalls. 
As Didion recounts her story, most of the incidences involving possessions as props for 
continuing bonds carry a positive and affirmative hue. On the other hand, instances of 
magical thinking, as the name suggests, are predictably more nebulous and fantastic. 
However, for all that, the function of material goods in this second modality remains 
benign. When it comes to the third modality, possessions as pitfalls, goods appear to 
exercise a more negative and ambivalent role, serving as painful reminders that whatever 
relationship or continuing bond she maintains with John, it is inevitably and irrevocably 
altered by his physical absence.   
 
In the early stages of grieving Didion is very much taken by what can only be described 
as the stark and vivid physicality of material objects, particularly objects associated with 
John. The presence of these objects, in all their singular detail, stands in marked contrast 
to the searing absence of the person who owned and used them. Their being there was a 
reminder in matter that he was not. She refers, for example to ‘our bedroom, the one in 
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which there still lay on a sofa a faded terrycloth XL robe bought in the 1970s at Richard 
Carroll in Beverly Hills’ (p. 5). Here, Didion captures ‘the strangeness of realising that 
things have outlived persons’ and ‘come to stand for them, in their absence’ (Gibson 
2008, p.1, 2004, p. 285).  
 
The night he died provides another telling example. There was much that unfolded on 
that night that she could only remember vaguely, but she offers minute and fine-tuned 
descriptions of receiving John’s personal inventory from the hospital authorities. Her 
account reads as a verbal close-up of objects that force themselves upon her on foot of 
their sheer physicality and presence:  
‘They gave me the silver clip in which John kept his driver’s license and credit 
cards. They gave me the cash that had been in his pocket. They gave me his 
watch. They gave me his cell phone. They gave me a plastic bag in which they 
said I would find his clothes … in the plastic bag there were a pair of corduroy 
pants, a wool shirt, a belt … The legs of the corduroy pants had been slit open, I 
supposed by the paramedics. There was blood on the shirt. The belt was braided’ 
(15/17).  
 
These and similar passages in the book bear testament to Didion’s insight that material 
possessions are never more alive than when those to whom they belong are no longer 
with us. Additionally, this passage shows how the rips and blood stains on John's clothes 
served to bring home the brute fact of his absence to her. The repeated refrain ‘they gave 
me’ further serves to mark the gulf that death opened between husband and wife; his 
possessions relied on the action of strangers, not their owner, to be returned to her. 
 
Despite the popularity of Kübler-Ross’ (1969) stage-based approach to the grieving 
process, there is a growing view that such linear sequential models fail to capture how 
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idiosyncratic and reversible it can be (Valentine, 2006). Didion’s novel cites times when 
products, places or people can act as pitfalls, ambushing unsuspecting and vulnerable 
survivors and disabusing them of any sense of being able to progress through their grief. 
She recounts a number of instances when life appeared to be getting back to normal only 
to be completely thrown by something she encounters, something that ruptures and 
reverses her sense of coping. As a case in point, she recalls driving down a street in LA 
where she was visiting her ailing daughter some months after John’s death:  
‘I cannot count the days on which I found myself driving abruptly blinded by tears 
… One afternoon I caught sight unprepared, of a movie theater in which John and 
I had in 1967 seen The Graduate. There had been no particular sense of moment 
about seeing The Graduate in 1967 … but the theater was still there, if only to 
trap the unwary. There were many such traps’ (117).  
 
It is as though the world of objects and places, particularly those that had been co-
consumed, were intent on ambushing her and conspiring to frustrate her best efforts to 
move on. Their arbitrariness meant that it was impossible to buttress herself against what 
lay in store on any given day.  No amount of ingenuity on her part could neutralise ‘the 
potential of places to trigger this vortex affect’ (113). In another case the culprit was a 
seemingly innocuous TV commercial:  
‘I fretted for example over a Bayer commercial for a low-dose aspirin that was 
said to ‘significantly reduce’ the risk of a heart attack. I knew perfectly well how 
aspirin reduces the risk of heart attack; it keeps the blood from clotting. I also 
knew that John was taking Coumadin, a far more powerful anticoagulant. Yet I 
was seized nonetheless by the possible folly of having overlooked low-dose 
aspirin’ (205). 
 
In this case the pitfall serves to draw her back into the conditional thinking mode of the 
immediate post-mortem period, into speculating about what might have happened ‘if …’. 
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The potential for goods to waylay those who are grieving is a striking example of the 
intense relationships that are possible between people and objects. In particular, it 
suggests that for bereaved people, goods can serve as a punctum, 'the element which rises 
from the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me…’ (Barthes, 1982, p. 26). 
 
Conclusions 
As Miller (2010, p. 153) reminds us:  
'[t]he study of material culture appears a rather circuitous route to understanding 
people and relationships, but we may arrive more swiftly at our destination, and reach 
much further, than many more tempting and more direct paths'. 
 
This paper has explored the nature of the relationships between people and the objects 
that surround them, and how traumatic life events can serve as a catalyst for heightening 
those relationships. Such traumatic events could include divorce, separation, or illness. 
Our analysis of The Year of Magical Thinking seeks in particular to progress the 
emerging interest in the intersection between bereaved people and their material 
surroundings, between grieving and consumer behaviour. This particular grief account 
highlights the myriad, nuanced and even paradoxical roles played by possessions and 
consumption experiences in the aftermath of significant loss. 
 
What was striking about many of the evocative objects in the book was their sheer 
mundaneness – chipped crockery, broken clocks, dollar bills, notebooks and a dressing 
gown. That mundane objects can become so significant should not surprise us; both 
Kopytoff (1986) and Epp and Price (2010) have shown to good effect how the mundane 
and quotidian can become special and singularised. Much of Didion's relationship with 
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her deceased husband is refracted and articulated through this motley, mundane and 
nondescript array of material artefacts. This was why this stuff mattered to her and 
mattered so much.  
 
The objects and places associated with her late husband marked out in matter the 
topography of Didion’s transformed and unwelcome life-world as a bereaved wife. That 
those particular goods delineated this new and altered world may well have been a matter 
of chance and cognitive convenience, suggesting that bereaved people are engaged in acts 
of bricolage, incorporating the objects at hand into their sensemaking enterprise. What 
those objects delineated was often a matter of acute poignancy and overwhelming 
intensity.  As evocative objects, each of these artefacts in turn spoke the same message, 
albeit transposed in a different register: John was gone and their earthly life together was 
now at an end. If Miller (2008) explores 'the sadness of lives and the comfort of things' 
(p. 3), Didion shows that things can confront as well as comfort us. Although this may 
seem to support Freudian notions of decathexis, there is little sense in the book of Didion 
withdrawing psychic energy from John's effects as a means of ‘letting him go’.  
 
It is worth reiterating here that Didion's singularising of objects and places associated 
with her deceased husband was not restricted to memorialising. Some goods may well 
have served as valued mementos of her deceased husband, but Didion does not dwell on 
these in the book. Rather, her emphasis is on how goods served as 'tools to think with' as 
she relearned the world, negotiated the vagaries and vicissitudes of life without him, and 
began to construct continuing bonds with him. Didion's account suggests three additional 
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modalities for person-object relationships in bereavement: tools for magical thinking, 
props for continuing bonds, and pitfalls. Conceptually distinct from the function of goods 
as memory markers, all three modalities are nonetheless predicated upon memory; 
remembering is a necessary but not sufficient condition for these particular forms of 
person-object relationships. Our findings also raised the broader issue of how these 
modalities fit in the wider tapestry of object attachment and agency. The particular 
modalities of object agency instanced in Didion’s narrative prompted the possibility of 
proposing general dimensions or classifications that could accommodate the wider 
universe of object attachment in consumer behaviour.  
 
Three broad dimensions suggested themselves. The first is emotional intensity. The 
blood-stained shirt returned to Didion by the hospital packed a more powerful emotional 
punch than the used biros left behind on his desk. As may be expected in an account of 
bereavement, many of the emotions were negative ones such as grief, guilt and sadness. 
Some emotions were more positive, however, such as the relief experienced at the 
Beverly Wiltshire hotel. The emotional tenor of person-object relations could also be 
ambivalent, as when guilt and regret were tempered by the ‘bliss of the conditional’ 
(Gilbert, 2006) when Didion contemplated the ‘what ifs’ that allowed her to conjure up a 
world in which John had not died.    
 
This emotional dimension resonates with other studies on person-object attachment in 
consumer behaviour. For example, Epp and Price (2010) explore a family's deep 
attachment to their long kitchen table that had been singularized and sacralized through 
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its incorporation into family rituals and storytelling. In contrast, Kleine et al. (1993) show 
how mundane products facilitate everyday activities, contributing at some level to self-
identity and social relationships.  
 
The second person/object dimension suggested by this study is agency locus. Scholars of 
materiality emphasise the dialectical nature of person-object relationships (Borgerson, 
2005; Miller 1987, 2008, 2010), acknowledging that ‘[while artifacts] are made by 
humans, they also help to make humans what they are, transmitting culture and shaping 
bodies and minds’ (Pattison, 2009, p. 55). As recounted by Didion, the relationship 
between people and objects is symbiotic; goods both effect and reflect her grieving. Put 
another way, across the three modalities, agency was sometimes, initiated by the person, 
but in others it was attributed to the object. Retaining John’s shoes and combining his 
dollar bills, for example, were both primarily done on Didion’s initiative, reflecting and 
effecting her continuing bond with John. Agency did not appear to reside only with the 
living however; continued co-ownership, for example, constituted ongoing, post-mortem 
agency.  The failure of the Christmas lights to come on, thereby trumpeting John’s 
absence, served as an augury and was ascribed to object agency. Other goods had the 
power to act as traps or pitfalls, challenging Didion’s sense of control and catapulting her 
into the “vortex” of her grief.   
 
Moving beyond the context of bereavement, the locus of agency in persons is instanced 
where inalienable bequeathed asset gifts function as surrogate caring family members 
(Bradford, 2009; Curasi et al., 2004) where gifts are used to reformulate relationships 
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(Ruth et al., 1999), where older people secure emotional attachment with survivors 
through the objects they leave them (Unruh, 1983) and where consumers eliminate 
product assortments to enable them forge new lives and relationships (Cherrier and 
Murray, 2007; Miller, 2010). Cases of agency ascribed to a product could be where 
sacred objects contaminate both humans and other objects (Belk et al., 1989), or where 
goods embody an undesired self (Karanika and Hogg, 2010; Lastovika and Fernandez, 
2005) or unhappy relationship (Miller and Parrott, 2009).  
 
Finally, Didion's account offers valuable insight into the temporal range of person-
object relationships, the power of objects to conjure up different tenses following loss.  
Some consumption phenomena, such as the cinema where she and John saw The 
Graduate, brought back the past, while others, such as the Christmas lights or the list of 
names from his novel, were seen to have intimated the future in the past. Continued co-
ownership – ‘John’s and my apartment’ – was a means of continuing his presence in the 
here and now. Consuming also allowed Didion to contemplate different futures:  the 
Aspirin advertisement prompted her to engage with ‘what ifs’ – the future that might 
have been, while his shoes were kept to facilitate his impending return – an impossible 
and fantastic future. Similar temporal variation might also be found in cases of illness, 
divorce or separation.  
 
On a broader plain, consumer researchers have discussed how objects such as heirlooms 
and intergenerational transfers speak to the past (Curasi et al., 2004; Heisley and Cours, 
2007), inflect present experiences (Epp and Price, 2010), or even influence family 
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members’ future lives (Price et al., 2000). By exploring how goods are implicated in the 
‘bliss of the conditional’ (Gilbert, 2006), this study adds further texture to our 
understanding of materiality's temporal dimension. Any of the agentic modalities found 
in Didion’s novel could be productively matched against these three person/object 
dimensions. For example, the torn clothing returned to her by the hospital, an example of 
the third ‘pitfall’ modality, carried a high emotional intensity, evidenced object agency,  
and underscored his sudden absence from her life at that moment in time.  Before leaving 
these three person-object dimensions it is worth cautioning against viewing them too 
monochromatically. The terms used to anchor each dimension – high versus low 
intensity, person versus object agency, and present versus past and future - are not 
intended to denote discrete clear-cut distinctions. For example the foregoing discussion 
on temporal range suggests that these dimensions operate in a way that is quite layered 
and nuanced. 
 
As indicated above, one way for Didion of giving flesh to her continuing bonds with John 
lay in trying to prolong their joint ownership of goods and possessions. The concept of 
co-ownership after death encourages us to acknowledge the role of objects in relational 
identity. ‘Bereaved people are repeatedly surprised at … the extent to which things take 
their meaning from the presence of another person’ (Parkes 1996, p. 91).  The 
meaninglessness of things, objects, and possessions experienced by survivors may well 
be a critical if overlooked component of more general feelings of meaninglessness 
reported by those who mourn (Attig, 2001; Berger, 1967; Hockey, 2001). Didion’s story 
reminds us that the meaning of many goods is not solipsistically conjured up but is rather 
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constituted and co-produced through significant others with whom we have interacted 
and with whom the goods were consumed. With the demise of a significant other, this co-
constituted meaning of valued possessions and experiences is threatened, and survivors 
are faced with the challenge of maintaining or changing these meanings alone.    
  
Furthermore, the onerous task of relearning the world during bereavement often includes 
relearning to consume - to consume certain objects again as an individual. Put another 
way, the survivor's relationship with an array of material goods has to be reconfigured. 
Didion’s narrative contains numerous instances of recoiling from consuming products 
and services, from visiting places, from listening to radio stations, all because she would 
have to do so as single and widowed for the first time. If learning to consume as an 
individual, where ‘we’ becomes ‘I’, was a daunting task, so too was accepting that ‘ours’ 
becomes ‘mine’. The move from plural to singular consumption exacts a heavy emotional 
toll precisely because it signals tacit recognition that the survivor is now physically alone.  
 
 
Didion’s insights should matter to friends, family and professionals seeking to help those 
facing loss. At the very least, they suggest that disposal and divestment following a 
bereavement may be bound up with important processes of sifting and sense-making, and 
that encouraging bereaved people to rid themselves of apparently redundant things may 
compound their loss rather than help them cope with it. A variety of service providers 
may be called upon to assist survivors in determining how best to deal with the personal 
inventory of their deceased loved ones: estate agents, caregivers and solicitors come to 
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mind. What Didion has to say suggests that they should tread warily, especially in the 
early stages of bereavement, allowing for the possibility that the emotional valence of 
belongings can modulate or even reverse over time.   
 
Didion's insights into person-object relationships also suggest that a sensitive response  to 
bereaved clients requires taking cues from them concerning the appropriate use of 
language. For example, and in the spirit of the continuing bonds perspective, providers 
might do well to recognise a relationship that endures and to be open to using the present 
rather than the past tense when speaking of the dead person – ‘is this something your 
husband would like?’ as opposed to ‘is this something your husband would have liked?’ 
Similarly, using the formal appellation ‘widow’ instead of ‘wife’, even on forms, can 
smack of unnecessary insensitivity and indiscretion. Service providers should also be 
sensitive to the slipperiness of agency in the aftermath of a death; given the power of 
magical thinking in bereavement, bereaved clients may attribute agency to the dead or to 
inanimate objects.  
 
Didion's account refers to her experiences in the year immediately following the death of 
her husband. Different person-object relationships may emerge over time, amongst other 
survivors, in different cultures, or in response to different types of loss, and this merits 
further research attention. Interviews with bereaved people may generate insight into 
these relationships, bearing in mind the ethical imperatives of engaging with people who 
are grieving (Parkes, 1995). Whilst not every grief account is penned by survivors with 
Didion's literary and observational skills, we suggest that other pathographies may still be 
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fruitful sources of insight into these relationships. We also suggest that the continuing 
bonds perspective represents a fresh and promising lens through which the nexus between 
goods and grieving can be profitably explored. Indeed, the growing acceptance of this 
perspective marks a window of opportunity for consumer researchers to engage more 
fully with other scholars in the thanatological field in order to explore the role of goods in 
creating, maintaining and modulating bonds with those who have died.  
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